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Formal model

This page sketches the formal object that DPO2U is trying to build.

Core entities​

Let:

  • S be a schema space of typed compliance statements
  • E be an evidence space, including off-chain artifacts identified by CID
  • A be a set of agents that can generate, validate, challenge, or consume statements
  • R be a set of regulatory contexts or jurisdictions
  • T be a timeline of attestations and revisions

A DPO2U attestation can be modeled as:

att = (s, e_ref, a_v, r, t, o)

Where:

  • s ∈ S is the claim or schema instance
  • e_ref ∈ E is an evidence reference, usually a CID or derived handle
  • a_v ∈ A is the validating agent
  • r ∈ R is the regulatory interpretation context
  • t ∈ T is the time of validation
  • o is the observable outcome, such as score, pass/fail, or bounded assertion

Protocol objective​

The protocol objective is not to maximize disclosure. It is to make o verifiable enough for the relying party while minimizing unnecessary exposure of e_ref and the underlying raw evidence.

Minimal correctness conditions​

A useful attestation protocol should satisfy at least:

  1. Schema validity — s parses and passes declared structural rules
  2. Evidence binding — e_ref is stable and corresponds to the evaluated artifact set
  3. Validator attribution — a_v is identifiable in a machine-readable way
  4. Temporal clarity — t is explicit so stale attestations are detectable
  5. Context binding — r is explicit so cross-jurisdiction interpretation is not silently assumed

Verification function​

We can define a protocol-level verification function:

V(s, e_ref, a_v, r, t) -> o

In practice, V may be partly deterministic, partly policy-driven, and sometimes supported by proof systems.

Where cryptography enters​

Cryptography is used to strengthen specific properties of V, especially:

  • integrity of evidence references
  • selective disclosure of inputs
  • public verifiability of bounded outputs

But DPO2U should be careful: not every valid attestation requires a zero-knowledge proof, and not every useful compliance workflow should wait for one.

Relationship to routing​

The formal model becomes more interesting once a relying party can choose among multiple validators, trust levels, and jurisdiction mappings. That is the routing problem described in Attestation routing.

Relationship to economics​

The formal model also needs a game-theoretic layer. If V can be corrupted cheaply, then formal structure alone is insufficient. That leads directly to the Incentive stability (ESS) problem.